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Veto players are political actors whose consent is necessary to adopt a new policy. Put otherwise, they 
have veto power which allows them to prevent a change to the status quo. The concept is crucial to the 
influential veto player theory developed by George Tsebelis. Building on earlier work in formal 
modeling and social choice, Tsebelis developed veto player theory to compare political systems in 
terms of their ability for policy change. A political system with a high number of veto players or with 
large ideological differences among veto players has high policy stability. High policy stability in turn 
can lead to government or regime instability as it becomes harder to adapt policy to changing 
circumstances. Furthermore, high policy stability increases bureaucratic and judicial independence as 
acts by these branches cannot be easily overruled by new or more specific legislation. Finally, high 
policy stability limits the effect of agenda-setting power. The following summarizes the main points of 
veto player theory, discusses some criticisms of it, and briefly compares veto player theory to 
Immergut’s concept of veto points.  
 
 
 According to veto player theory, policy stability depends on the number of and differences in 
preferences among veto players. Veto player theory distinguishes between institutional and partisan 
veto players. Institutional veto players are created by constitutional provisions that specify which actors 
have to give consent to pass a law. Partisan veto players are political actors who enjoy veto power due 
to the political circumstances. For example, the consent of political parties who form the government 
and have a majority in the parliament are needed in parliamentary systems to enact new legislation. In 
some instances, other societal actors like interest groups or the military exercise veto power, even 
though the constitution does not assign a formal role in the law-making process to them. To identify the 
relevant number of veto players one starts with the constitutional veto players and identifies the 
potential partisan veto players of which they are composed. For example, the constitution might specify 
that the laws have to be adopted by the government and the two chambers of a bicameral parliament 
each acting by simple majority. In other words, there are three institutional veto players. However, one 
has to take into account that both are not individual actors and identify the conditions under which its 
composite parts (e.g., cabinet members or parliamentarians) can exercise their institutional veto power 
collectively. If political parties are able to discipline their members,  the question is how many parties 
are needed to form the necessary majority in parliament and form the government. In our example, 
three parties may form the centre-left government and a majority in the lower chamber, but one 
opposition party is needed to reach a majority in the upper chamber. Thus, the number of veto players 
is four, when we take the political situation into account. In addition, one has to consider the possibility 
of partisan veto players who are not part of the constitutionally designated set of veto players. The 
number of veto players in a political system can differ not only across time but also policy field. A 
central bank for example might be a veto player in monetary policy but lack veto power in other fields. 
In our example, the government might rely heavily on the political support of a major trade union, 
giving them de facto veto power on government policy and thus increasing the count of partisan veto 
players to five. Finally, an “absorption rule” applies, because some veto players may be redundant, for 
example because they have identical policy positions. In our example, the social democratic party in 
government and the trade union might have exactly the same preferences. Thus, the actual number of 
de facto veto players is four.  
  Veto player theory is a neo-institutionalist theory, as it holds that policy outcomes can be 
explained by the preferences of the actors involved and the institutions governing the decision-making 
process. It is also a rational choice theory of politics, as it assumes that actors maximize their utility. 
Moreover, Tsebelis relies on spatial models to prove his propositions on the effect of the number of and 
the policy differences between veto players on policy stability. In particular, Tsebelis uses the concepts 
of a winset of the status quo and the core.  
 
 Spatial models build on the notion that  both political actors and public policies can be 
represented as positions in a political space. For example, political scientists as well as political 
commentary often refer to a position as being ‘leftist’ or ‘right-wing’, which indicates that policy 
stances can be depicted on a left-right dimension. Thus, political actors judge a policy proposal on how 
close it is to their most preferred policy (ideal point). Figure 1 provides an example of a two-
dimensional policy space with two political actors whose ideal points are depicted as the points A and B 
respectively. Consider initially a situation where A is the only veto player and is considering three 
proposals for a new policy (x, y, z). The location of the policy proposals in the policy space relative to 
A’s ideal point represent A’s evaluation of these polices. The closer a policy is to A’s ideal point, the 
higher is the utility A attaches to this proposal. In figure 1, A would prefer x to y and y to z (and x to z) 
based on their distances to its ideal position. To see this it is helpful to draw in indifference curves. 
Indifference curves form the set of points which yield the same utility as a given policy. If we assume 
that the policy dimensions are independent of each other and equally important, we can use circular 
indifference curves (otherwise they would by elliptical). Figure 1 gives the indifference curve of A for 
policy y. It is constructed by drawing a circle that has A’s ideal point as its centre and goes through 
policy y. A is indifferent between y and any other point on the circle as they are all equally far away 
from its ideal point. Points inside the A’s indifference curve vis-à-vis y such as x are closer to its ideal 
point than y and hence preferred to y. Points outside the indifference curve such as z are further away 
from A’s ideal point than y and consequently A would prefer y to them. Note that A’s assessment is 
purely based on the distances between its ideal point and prospective policies, not the direction. 
Usually, a policy is already in place which defines the status quo (sq).  
 
 A veto player would only adopt a new policy if it makes it better off  than the status quo, i.e.,  if 
it is inside its indifference curve vis-à-vis the status quo. In figure 1, A is indifferent between the status 
quo and y but would prefer x to the status quo. Policy stability can be gauged by the size of the winset 
of the status quo, ie., the number of policies that can defeat the status quo. The larger the winset of , the 
lower policy stability is.  In our initial example there is only one veto player. Hence, all policies that are 
preferred by A to the status quo could defeat the status quo. Consequently, the area inside his 
indifference curve vis-à-vis the status quo (the simply-hatched area) denotes the winset of the status 
quo.  
 
 If there are additional veto players,  a new policy needs the approval of all of them to replace 
the status quo. Suppose both A and B are veto players. A policy that can defeat the status quo has to be 
inside the indifference curves vis-à-vis the status quo of all veto players, otherwise it would fail to get 
approval by at least one of them. Thus, the winset of the status quo is formed by the intersection of the 
indifference curves of A and B vis-à-vis the status quo (cross-hatched area). Note that the winset of the 
status quo if both A and B are veto players is smaller than the one for A as the only veto player. Adding 
a veto player  increases policy stability.  
             
 
 Another measure of policy stability is the size of the core. The core is the set of points that 
cannot be defeated. i.e.,  have empty winsets. Thus there is no policy which all veto players would 
prefer to a policy that is located inside the core. Consider the scenario in figure 2 where A, B and C are 
veto players. Policy x has a non-empty winset. For example, policy y would be preferred by all three 
veto players to policy x. Thus, x is not part of the core. In contrast, y has an empty winset. There is no 
intersection of the indifference curves of A, B, and C for policy y. In other words, A, B, and C could not 
agree on changing policy y as they have diametrically opposed preferences. A wants to move the policy 
upwards and to the left, B wants to move it downwards and C wants to move it to the right. Indeed, all 
policies that lie between the ideal points of the veto players (dotted triangle) have an empty winset and 
thus form the core. Once a policy is inside the core, it cannot be changed (unless a veto player is 
eliminated or changes its position). The bigger the core, the more points cannot be changed and hence 
the greater is policy stability.  
 
 
 Adding a veto player increases the size of the core unless the ideal position of the new veto 
player lies inside the core of the original veto players.. In figure 3, the core for three veto players A, B, 
and C is denoted by the cross-hatched area. When a veto player D whose ideal point lies outside the 
core of the original veto players is added, the core grows (by the hatched area to the left) and policy 
stability increases. In contrast, adding a veto player whose ideal point lies inside the original core (e.g., 
E), or is identical to the one of an existing veto player, does not change the size of the core, illustrating 
Tsebelis’s “absorption rule.”.  The effect of adding a veto player thus depends on its policy preferences 
relative to the original veto players. Policy stability is also affected by the preference heterogeneity of 
veto players. Increasing the difference between the ideal points of veto players leads to higher policy 
stability. If C’s ideal point were for example, to move away from A and B (e.g. to C’), the size of the 
core (and hence policy stability) would increase.  
 
Greater policy stability implies more bureaucratic and judicial discretion. Agents charged with 
implementing policy (e.g., bureaucracy and courts) can depart from a policy as long as they stay within 
the core because their principals (e.g., the government and parliament) cannot change and overrule 
these policies. Greater policy stability also decreases the effect of agenda-setting power. A veto player 
has agenda-setting power if he can make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ proposal to the other veto players. It will 
choose the point closest to its ideal position while still being acceptable to the other veto players (i.e., 
inside the winset of the status quo). In figure 1, the outcome will be oA if A is the agenda-setter and oB 
if B is the agenda-setter. The smaller the winset, the smaller is the effect of agenda-setting power. 
 
 These results were formally derived for individual veto players. Many political actors, however, 
are collective actors, who are composed of members with different policy preferences and do not 
decide by unanimity. Using results from the social choice literature, Tsebelis argues that his findings 
are reasonable approximations for situations involving collective veto players.  
 
 In order to apply veto player theory, analysts must be able to identify  veto players and their 
policy preferences. In some instances scholars examining the same political system have come to 
different conclusion regarding these questions, highlighting the need to  justify conclusions carefully. 
For example, scholars disagree on whether or not opposition parties should be counted in the case of  
minority governments. Similarly, there is the question of whether or not all parties in a coalition 
government should be counted when the coalition includes more than the necessary number of parties 
for a majority in parliament. Furthermore, one could argue about the role of constitutional courts. More 
fundamentally, veto player theory describes actor’s preferences only in terms of policy. However, 
politicians may not be pure policy-seeking actors but also take into account who can take credit for a 
new policy, etc. Thus, some scholars have argued for distinguishing between various types of actors 
with veto power. 
  
 The consequences of the institutional setting and veto power on policy outcomes have also been 
addressed by the concept of veto points. In her comparative study of the development of health policy 
in Western Europe, Ellen Immergut stresses the different opportunities the political system presented to 
the medical profession in thwarting reform attempts by the executive. Veto points are created by the 
constitutional rules which govern where in the decision-making process a veto can be exercised and 
political circumstances. For example, parliament represents a veto point if it can overturn the decision 
of the executive and if it is not controlled by the same party as the executive. Interest groups can utilize 
these veto points to block legislation. Political systems differ in their set of veto points which affects 
the ability of interest groups to influence decision-making and subsequently leads to different policy 
outcomes. Immergut’s theoretical framework is similar to veto player theory in explaining the 
possibility of policy change in terms of veto opportunities, which are determined by rules of the game 
and political circumstances. She differs from veto player theory in her conceptualization of interest 
groups and the importance attached to them. Rather than being potential veto players interest group try 
to persuade actors to block legislation at existing veto points. Furthermore, she envisages the decision-
making process as a sequence of decisions (or possible vetoes) which draws more attention to the 
temporal dimension of policy-making than veto player theory.  
 
Andreas Warntjen 
University of Twente  
 
See also:  Spatial voting analysis 
 
 
  
Further readings: 
Ganghof, S. (2003). Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis, Swiss Political Science Review, 9, 
2, 1-25 
Ganghof, S. & Bräuninger, T. (2006). Government Status and Legislative Behaviour, Party Politics, 
12, 4, 521-539 
Kaiser, A. (1997). Types of Democracy. From Classical to New Institutionalism, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 9, 4, 419-444 
Immergut, E. (1992). Health Politics, Interests and Institutions in Western Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Jochem, S. (2003). Veto Players or Veto Points? The Politics of Welfare State Reforms in Europe. 
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia 
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 
 Figure 2 
 Figure 3 
